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The Constitutionality of the Use of the




In December 1990, the federal Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) approved Norplant, a revolutionary, long-acting contraceptive
device.1 Norplant is the first significant development in birth control in
three decades.2 The device consists of six match-sized, plastic tubes that
are surgically implanted under the skin of a woman's inner arm.3 Once
inserted the tubes continuously diffuse a synthetic hormone into the
bloodstream, effectively inhibiting conception for as many as five years.4
Norplant's contraceptive effects are temporary and once the device is re-
moved fertility returns almost immediately.' Because of its effectiveness
and convenience, Norplant presents a positive new option for women
seeking reliable, long-term, yet reversible birth control.
For these same reasons, however, Norplant also presents a special
temptation to some judges who view the device's short-term sterilizing
effects as a potential sentencing tool. Within months of its approval, sev-
eral judges around the country had already succumbed to Norplant's al-
lure. In California, Nebraska, and Texas, judges imposed use of
Norplant as a mandatory condition of probation for mothers convicted of
child abuse.6 The haste with which the criminal justice system adopted
the use of the device reflects at once the system's frustration with the
* Member, Third Year Class; A.B., Harvard College, 1986. The author thanks Jill
Simeone and Barrie Becker for their helpful comments and support.
1. Ellen Goodman, An Old Fix In a New Form, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 17, 1991, at 79.
2. Kim Painter, 'New Birth Control Option: As perfect a method as you can have, USA
TODAY, Dec. 6, 1990, at IA.
3. Carey Q. Gelerter, Long Term Contraceptive Implant Provides New Choice, Con-
cerns, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 20, 1991, at 7.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See infra Part IB.
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efficacy of existing measures in the fight against child abuse and the dan-
ger inherent in Norplant's novel powers. Relieved of the specter of per-
manent, punitive sterilization, a practice universally rejected after only a
brief period of acceptance at the turn of the century,7 the promise of
Norplant's temporary and reversible effects could prompt a revival of
court-ordered, albeit temporary, sterilization.
This Note explores the constitutional ramifications of these recent
probation orders. Part I examines the development of Norplant, its ad-
vantages and disadvantages as a birth control device, and its prompt
adoption by the criminal justice system, legislators, and commentators as
a novel remedy for child abuse and other societal ills. Part II considers
how the Norplant condition impairs an individual's right to privacy. Us-
ing the California case of People v. Johnson' as an analytical framework,
this section considers whether in the context of child abuse, the state's
interest in protecting children is sufficiently compelling to justify the in-
fringement of an individual's fundamental right to make personal deci-
sions regarding procreation, parenting, and medical treatment. In
particular, Part II reviews studies which indicate that family size may
contribute to the occurrence of child abuse and considers whether these
studies justify the imposition of Norplant as a means of protecting ex-
isting children from further abuse. Finally, Part III examines the impact
of mandatory Norplant use on an individual's constitutional rights to
equal protection and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.
This Note proposes that courts should never order Norplant use as a
condition of probation for defendants convicted of their first child-abuse
offense. Given the availability of alternatives less restrictive of the right
to privacy, the Norplant condition is unconstitutional when imposed
upon first time abusers. In the case of the recurrent abuser, this Note
concludes that although court-ordered contraceptive use may withstand
constitutional scrutiny, the risks involved in state-coerced relinquishment
of the right to reproduce are simply too grave to sanction. This Note
proposes that the role of Norplant in the fight against child abuse should
be restricted to those situations where the defendant volunteers to use it.
I. Norplant: Its Arrival and Its Implications
The FDA announced its approval of Norplant on December 10,
1990.9 Norplant is the first major advance in birth control technology
since the advent of the birth control pill twenty-five years ago. The con-
traceptive implant took over twenty years to develop.10 Initial clinical
7. See generally PHILIP R. REILLY, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION, ch. 4 (1991).
8. Superior Court of Tulare County No. 29390.
9. Goodman, supra note 1, at 79.
10. Id.; see also Tamar Lewin, Implanted Contraception Device Renews Debate Over
Forced Contraception, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1991, at A20.
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trials of the device indicate that it promises to be the most effective form
of temporary contraception available, with a cumulative five-year preg-
nancy rate of less than four in one hundred."1 Approximately 100,000
American women already use Norplant. Although this figure represents
less than one percent of the number of women presently taking birth
control pills, public health officials predict the device is on its way to
widespread usage.12
A. Mechanics of the Device: Its Attributes and Drawbacks
Norplant consists of six flexible, plastic capsules each of which con-
tains a small amount of the synthetic hormone progestin.13 Norplant
must be surgically implanted under the skin on the inside of the upper
arm. The procedure takes approximately fifteen minutes and is per-
formed with local anesthetic. Although a small incision must be made in
the arm, the primary cause of pain is the injection of the anesthetic. 4
Infection at the site of incision is rare, occurring in less than 1% of pro-
cedures; if infection does occur, the device is normally removed and an-
tibiotics are administered. 5
Once implanted, the hormone levonorgestrel (a type of progestin) is
diffused continuously into the bloodstream for up to five years. Unlike
birth control pills, Norplant does not contain any estrogen and contains
one-half to one-quarter of the amount of progestin used in oral contra-
ceptives; both of these hormones prompt adverse side effects and an elim-
ination or reduction in their use is advantageous. 6 In addition, because
of its use in birth control pills, progestin has been heavily studied for over
twenty-five years, alleviating concerns about the hormone's safety.'" Re-
moval of the Norplant tubes requires a second surgical procedure that
can be performed at any time after implantation."8
11. Mary Franklin, Recently Approved And Experimental Methods of Contraception, 35 J.
NURSE-MIDWIFERY 365, 369 (1990). See also PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 2484 (46th ed.
1992). This effectiveness rate compares favorably with reported rates of less than 1 in 100 for
birth control pills, approximately 18 in 100 for diaphragms, and 10 in 100 for the contraceptive
sponge. Id. at 2305, 2422.
12. Tamar Lewin, Five Year Contraceptive Implant Seems Headed for Wide Use, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 29, 1991, at Al.
13. PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 11, at 2484.
14. Philip D. Darney et al., Acceptance and Perceptions of Norplant Among Users in San
Francisco, USA, 21 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 152, 156 (1990) (87% of respondents in his study
reported no or only slight discomfort during insertion).
15. Jan Flattum-Riemers, M.D., Norplant: A New Contraceptive, AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN,
July 1991, at 103, 105.
16. Id. For a discussion of the side effects associated with Norplant, see infra notes 24-27
and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of potential safety problems with the plastic casing used for the de-
vice, see infra note 27 and accompanying text.
18. Flattum-Riemers, supra note 15, at 108.
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Norplant bars conception in a number of ways. In many women, it
entirely prevents ovulation; in others, a thickening of the cervical mucus
inhibits the migration of sperm; and in all users, a reduction in the thick-
ness of the endometrial lining of the uterus prevents implantation of the
fertilized egg.19
Norplant has several advantages over other birth control methods.
First, one of Norplant's most attractive features is its ease of use. Once
the six rods are implanted under the skin, the device works automati-
cally; the woman does not need to do anything further. There is no daily
pill to remember and no interruption of intercourse to accommodate
birth control. 20 In addition, Norplant is also readily reversible; after re-
moval, fertility returns quickly.21 One study indicated that 50% of for-
mer Norplant users conceived within four months of removal and close
to 90% of those who wished to conceive did so within a year.22 Finally,
Norplant users are generally satisfied with the drug; 80-98% of women
continue to use the product after one year and over 40% continue to use
it after five years.23
Despite its many advantages, Norplant is not for everyone. Medical
conditions contraindicating use include liver disease, blood clotting dis-
orders, pregnancy, diabetes, and hypertension.24 In addition, unpleasant
and sometimes serious side effects accompany Norplant use. One study
in San Francisco revealed that 95% of participating women suffered
from at least one of the implant's side effects and 61% reported suffering
from two or more.25 The most common side effect cited was disruption
in normal menstrual bleeding ranging from a complete cessation of
bleeding to spotting and prolonged bleeding; this disruption occurred in
60% to 70% of users.26 Other side effects included weight gain, head-
aches, mood changes, and acne.
In addition to the chemical side effects, the safety of the plastic cas-
ing used in Norplant is also suspect. The capsules are made of the same
material-silastic-that is found in the outer lining of the silicone breast
19. Id. at 103; see also Franklin, supra note 11, at 369.
20. Gelernter, supra note 3, at 7.
21. Id.
22. Flattum-Riemers, supra note 15, at 104.
23. Id. See also Darney et al., supra note 14, at 156 (74% of the 140 women in the study
reported they would use Norplant again in the future).
24. Franklin, supra note 11, at 370. See also PHYSICIANS' DEsK REFERENCE, supra note
11, at 2484.
25. Darney et al., supra note 14, at 156-57. Another disadvantage of Norplant is that the
cost of the device is high: $350 for the device and $150 to $650 for insertion and checkups.
Lewin, supra note 12, at A26.
,26. Darney et al., supra note 14, at 156-57. See also Flattum-Riemers, supra note 15, at
104-05 (reporting that most menstrual irregularities decline within one year, although they
may continue for the full five-year period in as many as 10% of users).
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implant, the safety of which the FDA is currently investigating.
2 7
Although a quarter of the women who experienced side effects claimed
not to be bothered by them, almost half considered having the device
removed because of adverse effects.28 Despite the existence of unpleasant
complications, many women have elected to use Norplant due to dissatis-
faction with other methods of contraception which often entail similar
side effects and lack Norplant's advantages.29
B. The Controversy Begins
Within months of its approval by the FDA in December 1990, Nor-
plant was embroiled in controversy in courtrooms, legislatures, and
newspaper opinion pages around the country. Elected officials, judges,
and other interested parties began advocating and implementing wide-
spread and sometimes mandatory use of Norplant, often as a means to
fight poverty.30 These initial proposals were of several types. The first
category advocated the development of state-sponsored "incentive" pro-
grams to promote the use of Norplant by lower income women. A sec-
ond set sought to enlist Norplant in the fight against fetal drug exposure.
The final category, initiated by several judges across the country, em-
ployed Norplant use as a condition of probation for mothers convicted of
child abuse.
L Welfare Recipients and Norplant
Representative of the first group of proposals is a bill introduced by
Kansas state representative Kerry Patrick during the 1991 legislative ses-
sion."1 After seeing statistics indicating that most women on welfare do
not take advantage of free family planning, he proposed House Bill 2089
that would offer "welfare mothers" a $500 "incentive" to use Norplant,
plus pay for the device and the cost of implantation and annual medical
checkups. 32  Representative Kathleen Sibelius, an outspoken critic of
27. PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 11, at 2484. However, this substance is
commonly used in surgical implants of all types and the amount of silastic used in Norplant is
relatively minor in comparison to the amount used in a breast implant. In addition, the cap-
sules are removed after a few years, unlike the breast implant which may remain in a woman's
body for forty years or more.
28. Darney et al., supra note 14, at 156-59 (noting that those women who discontinue use
of Norplant are more likely to have suffered side effects from the implant than those who
continue use).
29. Id. at 159.
30. Goodman, supra note 1, at 79.
31. Matthew Rees, Shot in the Arm: The Use and Abuse of Norplant, NEw REPUBLIC,
Dec. 9, 1991, at 16.
32. Sixty Minutes: Norplant (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 10, 1991) (interview with
Rep. Kerry Patrick by Ed Bradley). During the interview, Patrick argued that such an incen-
tive program would give welfare mothers a choice and "empower" them to decide whether or
not to use Norplant. Patrick denied that the legislation was racist or imbued with eugenic
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Patrick's proposal, argued in committee for more "realistic" uses of the
money at an earlier stage in a woman's life. She suggested that the same
money could be used for such things as scholarships and child care,
rather than as a "bounty" to coerce the use of a birth control device.33
The bill was defeated in 1991 by a vote of 77-27 in the House chamber.34
The Kansas Legislature did enact a second measure providing the Nor-
plant device free of charge to female welfare recipients through the Medi-
caid program. Currently, forty-eight states have similar provisions in
place.36 In Louisiana, state representative and unsuccessful gubernato-
rial candidate David Duke sponsored legislation offering $100 per year to
welfare recipients who use Norplant.3 7 The legislation was amended to
remove the cash incentive, but failed to emerge from the Senate Health
and Welfare Committee for consideration in the 1991 legislative
38session.
theory. He argued that the effect of Norplant is temporary and the purpose of the legislation
was to give women a chance to obtain important skills before they are burdened with multiple
children.
33. Id.
34. Rees, supra note 31, at 16. Representative Patrick has described himself as a "pro-life
Republican Presbyterian;" in 1992, he waged an unsuccessful bid to be the Republican nomi-
nee for Congress for his district. Id. He was required to give up his seat in the state legislature
to run for Congress and, therefore, he will be unable to pursue his legislative proposals in the
near future. No other Kansas state legislator has introduced similar legislation in the current
session. Telephone interview with Legislative Bill Status Office, Kansas Legislature (Sept. 3,
1992).
35. See, Sixty Minutes: Norplant, supra note 32.
36. Lewin, supra note 12, at Al. California has also instituted a program to provide Nor-
plant free to Medi-Cal recipients, bringing the total to forty-nine states. Controlling Birth
Control Urge, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 2, 1992, at A14.
37. Lewin, supra note 12, at A26.
38. Rees, supra note 31, at 16. Perhaps unpredictably, Planned Parenthood has endorsed
the use of "incentive" programs as a means of encouraging women to use the Norplant device.
One official from the organization has stated that: "Our agency believes that if a woman
chooses to accept extra welfare payments for using Norplant, it's a choice that the woman
makes and if she can get something extra for using birth control, that's positive." Id. at 17.
Planned Parenthood currently sponsors its own "incentive" plan; it pays "high-risk" teenage
girls one dollar for each day they don't get pregnant. Id. According to the New Republic,
incentive programs have been opposed by the National Organization for Women, the National
Abortion Rights Action League, Feminists for Life, Americans United for Life, and the Fam-
ily Research Council. Id. at 16-17. In addition, the American Medical Association has offi-
cially condemned state proposals to pay women welfare recipients to use Norplant. In
defending its position, the AMA's board of trustees argued that "[i]ndividuals should not be
required to assume a potentially serious health risk as a condition of receiving government
benefits, particularly when those benefits may be needed for basic human needs like housing,
clothing, and food." Board of Trustees Report, Requirements of Incentives by Government for
the Use of Long-Acting Contraceptives, 267 J. AMER. MED. ASS'N 1818, 1820-21 (1992) The
board also condemned court-ordered use of Norplant for women convicted of child abuse. Id.
at 1821.
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Finally, the day after the FDA approved Norplant, a Philadelphia
Inquirer editorial posited that Norplant could be an effective tool in solv-
ing the cycle of the permanent underclass and suggested giving incentives
to women on welfare to use the device.39 After receiving overwhelming
criticism of the proposal, the Inquirer retracted its opinion and apolo-
gized.' The defeat of both the Kansas and Louisiana legislation and the
hostile reaction to the Inquirer's editorial most likely reflects the public's
uneasiness with any measure that attempts to reduce the nation's "under-
class" by coercing its members not to reproduce.41
2. Norplant and Fetal Drug Exposure
The second category of initial Norplant proposals advocates the use
of the contraceptive to combat fetal drug exposure. In Washington state,
for example, several women "impatient with abusive parents" lobbied the
legislature about Norplant.4 z These women hope that the constant in-
crease in the population of drug-exposed children will prompt the legisla-
ture to impose Norplant as a means of preventing addicted women from
bearing children.43 Their pleas have not gone unheard. During last
year's legislative session, one state legislator introduced a bill that would
have authorized judges to order Norplant use for women who give birth
to drug or alcohol affected babies.' In addition, legislation requiring
convicted female drug abusers to use Norplant currently is under consid-
eration in both the Kansas and Ohio legislatures.45
39. Poverty and Norplant: Can Contraception Reduce the Underclass, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Dec. 12, 1990, at AI8.
40. An Apology: the Editorial on 'Norplant and Poverty' was Misguided and Wrongheaded,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 23, 1990, at C4.
41. At least one commentator has questioned whether these incentive proposals are actu-
ally improperly coercive. Noting that incentives are employed in a broad variety of situations,
the author concludes that "the mere offering of an incentive to stimulate the use of Norplant is
by no means coercive per se." Michael T. Flannery, Norplant: The New Scarlet Letter?, 8 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 201, 209-10 (1992). Flannery also argues that because the
incentives are not targeted at specific minorities, but rather at all welfare recipients, they are
not per se discriminatory. Id. at 210.
42. Christy Scattarella, Forced Birth Control?-Drug Baby Boom Sparks Call to Control
Female Addicts, SEATTLE TIMES, June 24, 1991, at Al.
43. Id. Estimates indicate that "a baby is born about once an hour in Washington to a
woman who has a serious problem with drugs or alcohol." The total cost to the state in
medical care and special education for these drug-affected children is estimated to be between
$29 and $46 million each year. Id.
44. Jim Simon, Heavy Hand of Welfare Reform-Legislators Planning To Get Tough, SE-
ATrLE TIMES, Jan. 31, 1992, at Bl. The legislation, HB2909, is sponsored by Representative
Joanne Brekke, a Democrat from Seattle.
45. Scattarella, supra note 42, at Al. The Kansas legislation, also sponsored by Represen-
tative Patrick, would require women convicted of felony possession of cocaine or heroine to
choose between Norplant and prison. Karen Southwick, 'Use Norplant, Don't Go to Jail'-
Judges, Social Workers and Medical Professionals Debate the Ethics, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 2,
1992, at 13 (This World section). The Ohio measure would make prenatal neglect an aggra-
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Although these bills have met with little legislative success, 46 the
idea of fighting fetal drug exposure through mandatory Norplant use has
strong popular support. A Los Angeles Times poll taken in the spring of
1991 revealed that 61% of respondents agreed that use of the Norplant
device should be made mandatory for female drug users of child-bearing
age.4 7 It may be only a matter of time before this popular support trans-
lates into political pressure on legislators to give fuller consideration to
measures imposing Norplant use on drug-addicted women.
3. Child Abusers and Norplant
The first actual target for mandatory Norplant use has been women
convicted of child abuse.48 While legislators and the public have wres-
tled with whether Norplant use should ever be encouraged through in-
centive programs or imposed as a criminal sanction for illegal drug use,
judges in four separate cases have independently mandated Norplant use
as a condition of probation for child abusers. In each case, the court
offered Norplant as part of a negotiated plea bargain designed to elimi-
nate periods of incarceration and combined the condition with other pro-
bationary terms, including parenting classes.4 9 Because of the significant
factual differences between them, a brief review of the four cases demon-
strates the initial arbitrariness with which courts have ordered Norplant
use.
In Tulare County, California, less than one month after the FDA
approved the new birth control device, Judge Howard Broadman of the
Tulare County Superior Court ordered Darlene Johnson to use Norplant
vated felony in the second degree. First-time offenders can choose between using Norplant or
entering a drug treatment program. For second-time offenders, Norplant use would be
mandatory. Rorie Sherman, Split Rulings for Fetal Abuse Cases, NAT'L L. JOUR., Feb. 24,
1992, at 3, 10.
46. All three bills have languished in committee. The Washington bill, HB 2909, failed to
emerge from the Health Care Committee in the 1992 legislative session. Telephone interview
with Legislative Bill Status Office, Washington Legislature (Sept. 4, 1992). The Kansas Legis-
lation, HB2255, died in the House Judiciary Committee. Telephone interview with Legislative
Bill Status Office (Sept. 4, 1992). Finally, the Ohio legislation, SB82, sponsored by Senator
Cooper Synder, failed to receive approval from the Senate Judiciary Committee during the
1991-1992 legislative session. Telephone interview with Legislative Information Bureau (Sept.
4, 1992).
47. George Skelton and Daniel M. Weintraub, The Times Poll; Most Support Norplant For
Teens, Drug Addicts, L.A. TIMEs, May 27, 1991, at Al, A34. A similar indication of wide-
spread public support for such measures can be found in a poll conducted by GLAMOUR MAG-
AZINE, a popular women's magazine, in which 55% of its readers supported mandatory
Norplant use for women convicted of child abuse. This is What You Thought, GLAMOUR
MAG., July 1991, at 101, 101.
48. See infra notes 50-74 and accompanying text.
49. Id.
NORPLANT AS A CONDITION OF PROBATION
as part of her negotiated, three-year probation." Judge Broadman's or-
der represents the first use of Norplant in a criminal sentence.5" Ms.
Johnson pled guilty to child abuse for beating two of her children with a
belt and electrical cord. Under the terms of her plea, Ms. Johnson was to
complete a short jail term and then continue with three years of proba-
tion during which time she was to use the Norplant device and partici-
pate in parenting classes and personal counseling. 2 Her children were
not taken from her custody; in fact the court specifically rejected this
option." The Norplant condition was stayed while Ms. Johnson pursued
an appeal challenging its constitutionality.54 The appeal was never con-
sidered. After twice testing positive for cocaine use during her proba-
tion, the court ultimately dismissed Ms. Johnson's appeal and revoked
her probation including the Norplant condition.55 She is currently serv-
ing a five-year prison term for her offense.5 6
In Lincoln County, Nebraska, Michelle Carlton, twenty-one, pled
guilty to felony child abuse in connection with the death of her six-
month-old son, Kevin.57 Kevin died as a result of being shaken repeat-
edly by Carlton's boyfriend, Keith Brown; the state charged Ms. Carlton
with negligent endangerment for failing to prevent her child's abuse.5"
As part of her plea arrangement, Lincoln County Judge James O'Rourke
ordered Ms. Carlton to serve two years probation, the terms of which
included mandatory Norplant use. In exchange, Ms. Carlton was con-
victed of a lesser misdemeanor and avoided imprisonment.5 9 In addition
to the birth control condition, Judge O'Rourke directed Ms. Carlton to
50. Mark Stein, Judge Stirs Debate With Ordering of Birth Control, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10,
1991 at A3, A31.
51. Lewin, supra note 10, at A20.
52. Michael Lev, Judge is Firm on Forced Contraception, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 11, 1991, at
A17.
53. Reporter's Transcript [hereinafter RT] from Felony Plea Hearing, at 11-12, in Clerk's
Transcript On Appeal, No. F015316 [hereinafter CT], People v. Johnson (Superior Court of
Tulare County, Cal. - No. 29390), at 49-50; see also RT from Motion to Modify Sentence, at
21-22.
54. CT, supra note 53, at 69.
55. Gene Garaygordobil, Norplant Case Defendant Jailed for Parole Violation, Gannett
News Service, Mar. 13, 1992. Ms. Johnson, therefore, never had the Norplant device inserted
in her arm. Telephone interview with Charles Rothbaum's office (Sept. 3, 1992) (Rothbaum
represented Ms. Johnson).
56. Garaygordobil, supra note 55.
57. USA TODAY, § News Nebraska, April 23, 1991, at 6A.
58. Telephone interview with Kent Turnbull, Lincoln County Attorney (Jan. 21, 1992).
Keith Brown pled guilty to manslaughter in connection with Kevin's death and was sentenced
to five to fifteen years in state prison. According to Mr. Turnbull, Mr. Brown shook Kevin to
death. A pathologist's report revealed sear tissue around the child's brain which indicated that
other shaking incidents had occured prior to his death. Mr. Turnbull noted that each year
during his prison term, on the child's birthday, Mr. Brown will be placed in solitary confine-
ment as a reminder of the tragedy.
59. Id.
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undergo counseling. The county temporarily removed her other child
from her custody.'
On a motion to modify sentence, Judge Lloyd Kaufman maintained
the contraceptive condition, but allowed Ms. Carlton to select the
method of birth control in consultation with her doctor. Although this
was Ms. Carlton's first conviction of child abuse in Nebraska, she had
several recorded child-abuse violations in Colorado. County Attorney
Kent Turnbull stated that the goal of the Norplant condition was not to
sterilize Ms. Carlton, but to make sure that before she has any additional
children she learns how to take care of them. He noted that through her
previous behavior, she had shown herself to be incapable of properly car-
ing for children.61
In Harris County, Texas, Cathy Lanel Knighten, twenty-three, pled
guilty to attempting to suffocate her ten-month-old child while the child
was hospitalized. Ms. Knighten's actions were captured on a video cam-
era which was placed in the child's room after nurses noticed that on two
occasions when the mother was visiting her child, the child had suffered
breathing problems.62 Ms. Knighten held her hand over her daughter's
face for over a minute, but stopped after a heartbeat monitor was acti-
vated. When confronted with the videotape, Ms. Knighten told police
that she had her hands full with two other children and she hoped to
keep her daughter in the hospital.63
Judge Doug Shaver imposed the Norplant condition as part of a
plea agreement that allowed the defendant to avoid imprisonment." In
addition to Norplant use, the judge also mandated that during the ten-
year probation period Ms. Knighten take parenting classes and agree to
only supervised visits with any children under the age of fourteen, in-
cluding her own.6" Ms. Knighten's children will remain with relatives
for the extent of the probation period.66
Although Ms. Knighten had Norplant implanted at the direction of
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Judge Orders Mother to be Given Contraceptive, UPI, Sept. 6, 1991, available in,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file.
63. Id.
64. Telephone interview with Donna Goode, Harris County Prosecutor, (Nov. 13, 1991).
65. Id. In an interview with United Press International, Ms. Goode reflected on the Nor-
plant condition, noting "[i]t was a question of whether someone like this goes to prison and
gets out and reproduces, or do we do something like this. [W]e've got a chance to make a
difference, and it's not irreversible." Judge Orders Mother to be Given Contraceptive, supra
note 62. A different judge in the same county recently approved a request by a convicted rapist
to be surgically castrated rather than serve prison time for his offense. Judge OKs Molester's
Plea to be Castrated, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 7, 1992, at A9. The defendant later reconsidered
his decision and elected to stand trial, rather than undergo the operation. Richard Lacayo,
Sentences Inscribed on the Flesh, TIME, Mar. 23, 1992, at 54, 54.
66. Judge Orders Mother to be Given Contraceptive, supra note 62.
the court, she suffered severe side effects due to her petite size.6 7 She
subsequently appeared before the court requesting the condition be modi-
fied. At her own suggestion, she agreed to undergo a tubal ligation.68
This was Ms. Knighten's first criminal conviction of any kind. No ap-
peal has been filed and one is not anticipated.
More recently, also in Harris County, Texas, a second convicted
child abuser avoided a prison term by agreeing to have Norplant im-
planted in her arn. 69 Ida Jean Tovar, a teenage mother of three, was
convicted of felony child abuse for violently shaking her two-month-old
son. He now suffers from brain damage and recurrent seizures as a result
of the abusive episode.7" Judge Patricia Lykos combined the Norplant
condition with numerous other probationary terms including a ninety-
day stay at a "boot camp," parenting classes, literacy courses, and in-
home detention.7 In addition, Ms. Tovar was denied custody of her
three children for the duration of her probation.72 Judge Lykos has said
she preferred the probation package to the available ten-year prison sen-
tence because she was "aware of the early release problem" from prison
and did not want Tovar to become another "in-and-out parolee no one
can find."'73 As in the Knighten and Carlton cases, no appeal has been
filed in the Tovar matter.74
67. Ms. Knighten is under five feet tall. The Physicians' Desk Reference reports that
progestin concentrations in the bloodstream will vary depending on body weight and other
factors. PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 11, at 2484.
68. The implications of this change in birth control method are significant. According to
one study, tubal ligations may not be reversible with successful reversal rates ranging from
41% to 84% depending on the method of sterilization used. Given this, the chances that Ms.
Knighten is now permanently sterilized are high. Operations for Sterilization of Men and Wo-
men, CURRENT OBSTETRIC & GYNECOLOGIC DIAGNOSIS & TREATMENT 1987, at 827-28
(Martin L. Pernoll, M.D. and Ralph C. Benson, M.D. eds.).
69. Child Abuser Chooses Norplant Over Prison, ABORTION REPORT, March 12, 1992,
(State Report - Texas).
70. John Makeig, Surgical Deterrent; Mom Convicted of Child Abuse Picks Birth-control
Implant over Prison, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 6, 1992, at Al.
71. Id.
72. Telephone interview with Mark Ellis, Harris County Prosecutor (Sept. 4, 1992).
73. Makeig, supra note 70, at Al. According to Mr. Ellis, Judge Lykos was concerned
that Ms. Tovar would serve only a small fraction of the seven years prison sentence requested
by the state because, in practice, defendants normally serve only a few months for each year in
jail to which they are sentenced for non-aggravated offenses. The Norplant condition was
imposed on Judge Lykos' own initiative as were the other probationary conditions. The state
had recommended prison time for Ms. Tovar. Telephone interview with Mark Ellis, supra
note 72.
74. Telephone interview with Mark Ellis, supra note 72. The absence of appeal in the
Carlton, Knighten, and Tovar cases may indicate, in part, that the imposition of this condition
as part of a plea negotiation circumvents the constitutional scrutiny such a proposal would
face in the legislative arena. In many cases, it can be expected that an individual would choose
probation over incarceration despite the presence of potentially constitutionally objectionable
conditions. See Colleen M. Coyle, Note, Sterilization: A "Remedy for the Malady" of Child
Abuse?, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 245, 252-55 (1989).
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The variety of circumstances in these first four Norplant cases dem-
onstrates the arbitrary manner in which courts have initially imposed
Norplant use. Although all four women were convicted of child abuse,
the cases differ in other significant details. For example, although three
of the four women were first time offenders, Ms. Carlton had previous
child-abuse violations.75 In addition, the severity of abuse inflicted on
the children varied from case to case, ranging from death, to permanent
brain damage, to a more "traditional" belt strapping in the Johnson case.
Despite these important differences, all four women were subjected to the
same dramatic probation condition.76 Such uniform treatment of dissim-
ilar defendants raises two major concerns. First, and perhaps most im-
portantly, a judicial determination of the constitutionality of court-
ordered Norplant use is imperative before the rights of future defendants
are affected. Second, these initial cases suggest that the only way to con-
trol the current unfettered use of court-ordered Norplant is to define the
circumstances, if any, under which Norplant can be appropriately em-
ployed by the criminal justice system and to limit its use to only those
circumstances. The lack of an appeal in all four of the cases77 suggests
that these issues may remain unaddressed for some time. The remainder
of this Note will consider each of these issues in turn.
C. A Case Study-People v. Johnson
7
1
The Darlene Johnson case is a useful model to test the constitution-
ality of the Norplant condition for several reasons. First, because John-
son was a first-time abuser who inflicted comparatively slight abuse on
her children, opponents of the Norplant condition have pointed to her
case as a particularly strong example of the dangers of court-ordered
Norplant use.79 Second, the Johnson case is the only one of the four
cases in which an appeal was pursued."0 Although the appeal was ulti-
mately dismissed,81 both the state and Ms. Johnson's advocates thor-
oughly briefed the issues raised by the unusual condition and their
arguments provide a helpful source of discussion and analysis. Finally,
the standard of review used by California courts in considering the con-
stitutionality of probationary conditions is particularly rigorous 2 and of-
75. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
76. See infra Part IB(3).
77. As noted above, Darlene Johnson did appeal her condition, but the appeal was ulti-
mately dismissed prior to review. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
78. Information regarding the trial proceedings gathered from: CT, supra note 53; Bill
Ainsworth, "I Take Away People's Rights All the Time"' LEGAL TIMEs, Apr. 8, 1991, at 10;
Lewin, supra note 10, at A20; and Lev, supra note 52, at A17.
79. See, e.g., Appellant's Reply Brief at 1, People v. Johnson (Ct. of Appeal -Fifth Appel-
late Circuit - No. F015316).
80. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
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fers a comprehensive framework within which to analyze the
constitutional soundness of the Norplant condition. Prior to embarking
on any legal analysis of the condition, however, a review of the circum-
stances under which it was imposed is in order.
On December 3, 1990, Darlene Johnson pled guilty to three counts
of felony child abuse in violation of California Penal Code section
273(d). 3 Although this was her first child-abuse offense, Ms. Johnson
had a criminal record consisting of six previous convictions involving
petty theft and check fraud for which she served two years in prison. 4
When Ms. Johnson entered her negotiated plea, Judge Broadman
predicted that the terms of her probation would include mandatory par-
ticipation in parenting classes, personal counseling, and a condition
prohibiting Johnson from smoking during the remainder of her preg-
nancy. Although he commented that he was "going to try and think...
of some special probation conditions for this lady," at no time during the
hearing did Judge Broadman reveal that he might impose the use of Nor-
plant.85 The judge remanded Ms. Johnson to custody for the month be-
tween the plea and sentencing hearings in part because he was
"concerned about drug use" and she was pregnant.86 Nothing in the
record suggested that Ms. Johnson was a substance abuser and she spe-
cifically denied the accusation during the subsequent sentencing
hearing.
8 7
Judge Broadman announced the Norplant condition during the sen-
tencing hearing on January 2, 1991.88 During the hearing Judge
Broadman asked Ms. Johnson whether she had ever heard of Norplant;
she responded that she had not. He then provided the following descrip-
83. CT, supra note 53, at 19.
84. See Lev, supra note 52, at A17.
85. RT from Felony Plea Hearing, at 3, in CT, supra note 53, at 20.
86. RT from Judgment Proceedings, at 3-4, in CT, supra note 53, at 41-42. For a discus-
sion of the constitutionality of judges using the sentencing phase of trials to incarcerate preg-
nant, substance-dependent women to protect fetal health, see Barrie L. Becker, Order in the
Court: Challenging Judges Who Incarcerate Pregnant, Substance-Dependent Defendants to
Protect Fetal Health, 19 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 235 (1991).
87. CT, supra note 53, at 51.
88. At the time Broadman announced the condition, Norplant was not even available on
the market. Lewin, supra note 10, at A20. Interestingly enough, this was not the first time
that Judge Broadman thought to impose contraception as a condition of probation. In the fall
of 1990, Judge Broadman was sentencing a petty-theft convict for possession of heroin. The
judge told the woman that he would not send her to jail if she participated in a drug counsel-
ling program and did not become pregnant for five years. Judge Broadman did not specify
what type of birth control she had to use. The judge later withdrew this settlement and sen-
tenced the woman to two years in jail after she was late for her sentencing hearing. Ainsworth,
supra note 78, at 10. The Norplant decision has ignited passions on all sides of the reproduc-
tive rights debate. In March 1991, an anti-abortion activist entered Judge Broadman's court
room and shot at him stating that Norplant kills babies. The bullet just missed Judge
Broadman's head. Id.
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tion of the device: "it's a thing that you put into your arm and it lasts for
five years ... it's like birth control pills, except you don't have to take
them every day."89 When Ms. Johnson asked whether the contraceptive
was "harmful to the body," Broadman responded that "it's like a birth
control pill. It's FDA-approved."9 ° He did not discuss the myriad of
potential side effects, the surgical implantation procedure, or the novelty
of the device. Most importantly, he did not advise her, perhaps because
he did not know, that the substance is contraindicated for women with
certain medical conditions. According to her attorney, Charles
Rothbaum, Ms. Johnson suffers from high blood pressure and diabetes,
both of which contraindicate Norplant use.
Judge Broadman emphasized, however, that the effects of the con-
traceptive were temporary and offered her an opportunity for reprieve,
stating, "[i]f you want to get pregnant, you can come back and say...
'look I did all my parenting classes,' whatever, and we'll move from
there."9 Based on this discussion, Ms. Johnson agreed to use the device
and consented to the other terms of her probation. Although the court
ordered Ms. Johnson not to strike her children, it did not take steps to
remove them from her custody.
92
On January 7, 1991, five days after the sentencing hearing, Ms.
Johnson filed a motion to reconsider sentence.93 The motion challenged
the statutory and constitutional validity of the imposed sentence and
questioned the adequacy of Ms. Johnson's consent to the Norplant con-
dition.94 In addition, defense counsel argued that prescribing Norplant
from the bench violated Business and Professional Code section 2053,
which prohibits the practice of medicine without a license.95 Judge
Broadman was unpersuaded by these arguments. In response to con-
cerns that Norplant might be unsuitable given Ms. Johnson's health, the
court noted that it would appoint a doctor to determine her suitability
for the device.96 Judge Broadman rejected all challenges posed and em-
89. RT from Judgment Proceedings, at 6-7, in CT, supra note 53, at 44-45.
90. Id. Because once the device is implanted, it continuously diffuses hormones into the
bloodstream, this last comment must have referred to the fact that unlike the birth control pill,
Norplant is self activating.
91. RT from Judgment Proceeding, at 7, in CT, supra note 53, at 45.
92. Id at 49-50.
93. Motion to Reconsider Sentence, in CT, supra note 53, at 31.
94. Despite Judge Broadman's reliance on Ms. Johnson's "willing, knowing, voluntary
acceptance of the probationary terms," California decisional law clearly permits a defendant to
challenge a condition to which he or she has given consent. See, e.g., In re Bushman, 463 P.2d
727, 733 (Cal. 1970) (stating that a defendant who accepts probation "may seek relief from the
restraint of any alleged invalid condition of probation on appeal from the order granting pro-
bation or on habeas corpus").
95. RT from Motion to Reconsider Sentence, at 6-7, in CT, supra note 53, at 36-37.
96. Appellant's Opening Brief at 12, People v. Johnson (Cal. Ct. App. - Fifth App. Dis-
trict - No. F015316) (citing RT from Motion to Modify at 23).
phasized the importance of protecting Ms. Johnson's unconceived chil-
dren, stating: "It is in the defendant's best interest, and certainly in any
unconceived child's interest, that she not have any more children until
she is mentally and emotionally prepared to do so.""
On January 22, 1991, Ms. Johnson filed an appeal in the California
Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District.9" The Norplant condi-
tion was stayed pending the outcome.99 The appeal was never heard,
however, because Ms. Johnson twice tested positive for cocaine use dur-
ing her probation."°° As a result, Ms. Johnson's probation was re-
voked.'01 Her case was consequently dismissed, and the decision not to
hear the appeal means that no legal precedent has been set in the case
because "California law bars as precedent any order issued by a trial
judge."
10 2
II. The Norplant Orders and the Constitutional
Right to Privacy
By ordering Darlene Johnson to submit to Norplant use in exchange
for an elimination of an available prison sentence, Judge Broadman en-
tered a constitutionally sensitive area. Both the federal and California
Constitutions guarantee to all individuals a fundamental right to privacy
which a state may infringe for only the most compelling reasons. 03 At
the same time, courts have recognized that probationers may be required
to forfeit some of their constitutional rights as a consequence of their
criminal behavior if such forfeiture relates to the goals of probation."°
The Johnson case raises an interesting constitutional dilemma and ex-
poses an underlying tension between different aspects of the right to pri-
vacy that exists in child-abuse cases.105 This section will examine the
current status of the constitutional right to privacy implicated in the
Johnson case. In addition, it will consider whether the use of Norplant
can be defended as a reasonable and constitutionally permissible condi-
tion of probation for women convicted of child abuse.
97. Respondent's Supplemental Brief at 8-9, People v. Johnson (Ct. of Appeal - Fifth
Appellate District - No. F015316) (citing RT from Motion to Reconsider at 19-21).
98. CT, supra note 53, at 69.
99. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 96, at 3 n.2.
100. David Cooper, Woman in Norplant Case Ordered Back for Sentencing, Gannett News
Service, Mar. 13, 1992.
101. Superior Court Judge David Allen sentenced Ms. Johnson to five years in jail; she is
serving her sentence at a California Rehabilitation Center where she will undergo drug treat-
ment. Id.
102. California: Mandated Norplant Now Irrelevant, ABORTION REPORT, April 15, 1992.
103. See infira notes 106-33 and accompanying text.
104. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
105. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
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A. The United States and California Constitutions and the Right to
Privacy
Both the United States and California Constitutions provide a right
to privacy that protects decisions regarding procreation, parenting, and
medical treatment from government intrusion. 10 6 The Johnson case im-
plicates all three of these aspects of the right to privacy.
First, the federal Constitution provides a right to privacy that
reserves to a woman all decisions regarding procreation and which may
be impaired only in furtherance of a compelling state interest. Although
this right is not textually explicit, the Supreme Court repeatedly has rec-
ognized its presence in the various "zones of privacy" embodied by the
federal Constitution." 7 In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court first at-
tempted to characterize the source of an individual's privacy interests,
noting that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance.... Various guarantees create zones of privacy."' 1 8 The court
concluded that these "zones of privacy" include the right of married
couples to use contraceptives.
10 9
In Carey v. Population Services International,'0 the Court reviewed
the established contours of the right to privacy, 11 noting that "the deci-
sions that an individual may make without unjustified government inter-
ference are personal decisions . . . involving marriage, procreation,
contraception, and family relationships."' "12 The Court continued: "The
decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart of this
106. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1. Although the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not explicitly guarantee a right to privacy, courts have relied on its due process
clause to infer such a right. See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
107. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1964) (majority and concurring opinions relied
on the First, Third, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to derive a generalized right to
individual privacy).
108. Id. at 484, 486.
109. Id. at 486. This right to use contraceptives was later extended to unmarried individu-
als. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). It was in Skinner v. Oklahoma, a case decided
on equal protection grounds, that the court first recognized the right to marry and procreate as
basic civil rights "fundamental to the very survival of the race." Skinner v. Okla., 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1941). For a further discussion of Skinner see infra notes 196-98 and accompanying
text and 240-42 and accompanying text.
110. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
111. More recent decisions by the Court indicate its willingness to curb certain of these
rights particularly regarding access to abortion. See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv.,
492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989); Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1776-77 (1991).
112. Carey, 431 U.S. at 684 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (other cita-
tions omitted)). Although there have been no cases dealing with the mandatory use of birth
control in relation to the right to privacy, this final language regarding the prevention or ac-
complishment of conception appears to indicate the court's intention that not only may an
individual not be prohibited from using contraception, he or she also may not be required to
use it.
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cluster of constitutionally protected choices ... [and] decisions whether
to accomplish or prevent conception are among the most private and
sensitive."' 13 By requiring Ms. Johnson to submit to involuntary contra-
ceptive use, the Norplant condition directly impairs her reproductive
autonomy.
As indicated in Carey, the Court also has recognized within the
right to privacy an individual's fundamental right to parent and to rear
children." 4 It has done so by construing the Fourteenth Amendment as
a guarantee of the freedom to make independent decisions regarding fam-
ily life."' The Court has stated that: "It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first with the parents, whose
primary function and freedom.., the state can neither supply nor hin-
der."" 6 In regard to neglectful or abusive parents, the Court has cau-
tioned that the fundamental right of parents to raise and care for their
children "does not evaporate simply because they have not been model
parents.""17By temporarily depriving Ms. Johnson of the option to con-
ceive and bear children, the Norplant order also directly restricts her
constitutionally recognized "right to parent."
Finally, the Supreme Court has extended the right to privacy to in-
clude the right of an individual to refuse unwanted medical treatment
and other invasions of bodily integrity.'18 In her concurring opinion in
Cruzan v. Director, Justice O'Connor noted that "the liberty guaranteed
by the Due Process Clause must protect ... an individual's deeply per-
sonal decision to reject medical treatment." '119 The Court has also recog-
nized the existence of an individual's right to refuse medical treatment in
criminal settings. 2° By requiring Ms. Johnson to use a contraceptive
device during her probation, Judge Broadman's order prevented Ms.
113. Carey, 431 U.S. at 685.
114. Id. at 687. The Court has relied on three different constitutional provisions to protect
the integrity of the family relationship from unwanted state interference. See, eg., Meyer v.
Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (Due Process Clause); Skinner v. Okla., 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942) (Equal Protection Clause); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 489 (1965) (Ninth
Amendment).
115. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (holding that before state could perma-
nently terminate a parent's rights in a child it must support its allegations of neglect and abuse
by at least clear and convincing evidence).
116. Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
117. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753. See also Stanley v. Ill., 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) ("The
Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The rights to conceive and to
raise one's children have been deemed 'essential.' "); Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
118. See Cruzan v. Director, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 (1990) ("The principal that a competent
person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment
may be inferred from our prior decisions."); see also Rochin v. Cal., 342 U.S. 165, 172-74
(1952).
119. Id. at 2857.
120. See, eg., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 755 (1985).
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Johnson from exercising her constitutionally guaranteed right to refuse
medical treatment.
The California Constitution also recognizes the three different as-
pects of privacy recognized in the federal Constitution. In 1972, voters
in California approved an amendment to article 1, section 1 of the Cali-
fornia Constitution, which added the right of privacy to the other ina-
lienable rights outlined therein.1 21 Unlike the federal Constitution, the
textual explicitness of the California amendment makes forays into im-
plied "zones of privacy" unnecessary. Indeed, since its enactment, the
privacy clause of Article I consistently has provided greater protection to
the individual than the corresponding federal penumbras.' 22 California
courts have interpreted it to include the right of procreative choice, a
right which has frequently been asserted to safeguard personal decisions
about abortion,1 23 contraception,1 24 and sterilization.'
25
The California Supreme Court also has recognized that the right to
parent one's children is fundamental in nature.1 26 In accordance with
federal decisions in this area, the California Supreme Court has stated
that "the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and
management of his children is a compelling one, ranked among the most
basic of civil rights."1 27 Further, the Court has declared that any state-
ordered disruption of the family relationship should only occur in "ex-
treme cases of persons acting in a fashion incompatible with
parenthood." 128 Finally, the California Constitution also safeguards an
individual's fundamental right to refuse medical treatment.1 29
B. Permissible Impairment of Constitutional Rights-State Regulation
on Behalf of a Compelling Interest
A determination that both the federal and California constitutions
recognize the various aspects of the right to privacy implicated in the
121. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 224-25 (Cal. 1975).
122. Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Van de Kamp, 226 Cal. Rptr. 361, 378 (1986).
123. Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 798 (Cal. 1981).
124. People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1984).
125. Conservatorship of Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760, 774 (Cal. 1985).
126. See In re B.G., 523 P.2d 244, 250 (Cal. 1974). See also In re Angelia P., 623 P.2d 198,
202 (Cal. 1981).
127. In re B.G., 523 P.2d at 250.
128. In re Carmaleta B., 579 P.2d 514, 518 (Cal. 1978) ("[T]he involuntary termination of
[the parent/child] relationship by state action must be viewed as a drastic remedy which
should be resorted to only in extreme cases of neglect or abandonment.").
129. Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1972) ("[A] person of adult years and in sound
mind has the right, in the exercise of control over his body, to determine whether or not to
submit to lawful medical treatment."); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301
(1986) ("[T]he right to refuse medical treatment is basic and fundamental."); Bartling v. Supe-
rior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 224 (1984); Conservatorship of Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840,
853 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958 (1988).
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Johnson case as fundamental is not dispositive of the constitutionality of
the Norplant condition. Rather, both the United States and California
Supreme Courts permit state impairment of the right to privacy if the
state can justify its action by demonstrating a compelling interest.
In Carey v. Population Services International, for example, the
United States Supreme Court held that although "the constitutionally
protected right of privacy extends to an individual's liberty to make
choices regarding contraception... [it] does not, however, automatically
invalidate every state regulation in this area." 3' Rather, "even a bur-
densome regulation may be validated by a sufficiently compelling state
interest." ' Similarly, the California Supreme Court has permitted state
interference with the right to privacy if "the state... demonstrate[s] that
'the utility of imposing the conditions ... manifestly outweighs any re-
sulting impairment of constitutional rights.' "132 But the Court also has
stated that because the right involved (in this instance the right to choose
whether or not to reproduce) is "among the most intimate and funda-
mental of all constitutional rights,... only the most compelling of state
interests could possibly satisfy this test." '133 In the Johnson case, there-
fore, to justify its order of Norplant use, the state of California would
have had to demonstrate that its value to the public outweighed the con-
sequent impairment of Ms. Johnson's constitutional rights. Before exam-
ining the adequacy of the state's justification in the Johnson case, it is
necessary to consider the status of an individual's constitutional rights in
the special context of probation.
C. By Accepting Probation, Probationers Do Not Waive Their
Constitutional Rights
The constitutional rights of probationers are not absolute and "may
be reasonably restricted in the public interest." '34 California courts en-
joy broad discretion when crafting conditions of probation. 35 This dis-
cretion, however, is not boundless; rather, it is circumscribed by both
constitutional and statutory safeguards. '36
130. Id., 431 U.S. 678, 685-86 (1977).
131. Id. at 686.
132. Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 791 (Cal. 1981) (quoting
Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp., 421 P.2d 409, 415 (Cal. 1966)).
133. Myers, 625 P.2d at 793.
134. In re White, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 567 (1979).
135. In re Bushman, 463 P.2d 727, 732-33 (Cal. 1970).
136. In re White, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 565. Because this Note focuses on the Darlene Johnson
case, the California standard for reviewing constitutionally challenged probation conditions
will be used. It should be noted, however, that most federal courts and both Nebraska and
Texas - the two other states in which judges have imposed Norplant - use the less stringent
"reasonably related" standard to determine whether probation conditions are constitutionally
fit. See, e.g., State v. Morgan, 295 N.W.2d 285, 288 (Neb. 1980) (Probation conditions which
restrict constitutional rights "should be sparingly imposed and should be reasonably related to
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In an interview after Ms. Johnson's sentencing hearing, Judge
Broadman defended his imposition of Norplant and the resulting impair-
ment of Ms. Johnson's constitutional liberties arguing, "I take away peo-
ple's rights all the time when I send them to jail; that's what judges
do." 137 But courts have consistently rejected the argument that because
probation is offered in lieu of incarceration-a condition which greatly
restricts a defendant's constitutional rights 1 3-- there can be no legitimate
claim that a term of probation infringes upon constitutionally protected
interests.139 Rather, many have urged that given the rehabilitative goals
of probation, constitutional interests should be protected to the greatest
extent possible.' 4° As a result, courts recognize that a probationer is en-
titled to a considerable amount of privacy under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the federal Constitution. 141 The California Constitution
provides similar protection for a probationer's constitutional rights.
1 42
California courts1 43 have held that "where a condition of probation
requires a waiver of precious constitutional rights, the condition must be
narrowly drawn; to the extent it is overbroad it is not reasonably related
to the compelling state interest in reformation and rehabilitation and is
an unconstitutional restriction on the exercise of fundamental constitu-
the offense for which the defendant was convicted."); Simpson v. State, 772 S.W.2d 276, 281
(rex. 1989) (Condition restricting probationer's constitutional right to privacy must be "rea-
sonably calculated to contribute significantly to the rehabilitation of [the defendant] and to the
protection of society in general.").
In addition, it should be noted at the outset of this analysis that California courts review
probationary terms for compliance with both statutory and constitutional requirements.
Under California Penal Code § 1203.1, a court is given broad, but not limitless, discretion in
prescribing conditions of probation. Conditions of probation must be assessed in terms of a
three-part reasonableness test. This test was defined in People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr.
290 (1967), and dictates that "[a] condition of probation which (1) has no relationship to the
crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal,
and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality does
not serve the statutory ends of probation and is invalid." Id. at 293. A statutory analysis of
the Norplant condition is beyond the scope of this Note. However, even if the condition were
to survive this analysis, it would still need to pass the more rigorous constitutional analysis
discussed herein.
137. Ainsworth, supra note 78, at 10.
138. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 22-23 (1990).
139. See, e.g., In re Mannino, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880, 888 (1971) (Although "petitioner's convic-
tion subjected him to imprisonment which would restrain his [constitutional rights].., it is an
over-simplification to conclude that the greater restraint should include the lesser.").
140. White, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 568 ("Unlike the purpose of imprisonment which is punish-
ment, the purpose of probation is rehabilitation."). See also People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759,
769 (1971) (dissenting opinion) ("The function of probation is to strengthen independent judg-
ment and internal controls, and to give the individual selective responsibility over his own
actions.").
141. People v. Keller, 76 Cal. App. 3d 827, 832 (1978).
142. People v. Pointer, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1128, 1139 (1984).
143. See, e.g., In re White, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1979).
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tional rights." '  California courts have embodied this standard in a
three-part "compelling interest" test to determine whether a condition of
probation is constitutional: (i) the condition must reasonably relate to
the intended purpose of probation; (ii) the value to the public from the
imposition of the condition must manifestly outweigh any resulting im-
pairment of the probationer's constitutional rights; and (ifi) there must be
available no alternative means less subversive of constitutional rights.145
1. Part One: Does the Norplant Condition Further the Purposes Sought by
Probation?
California courts have concluded under part one of the compelling
interest test that the goals of the probation code are "to foster rehabilita-
tion and to protect public safety."' 46 In the Johnson case, the hope was
that proper counseling and instruction, and in Judge Broadman's view,
the temporary postponement of additional children, would have provided
Ms. Johnson with the skills necessary to avoid a recurrence of abuse
against her children. To satisfy part one of the analysis, however, the
state would have had to demonstrate that the Norplant condition would
have somehow furthered Ms. Johnson's rehabilitation.
Judge Broadman argued that Norplant would have helped Ms.
Johnson improve her parenting capabilities. At the hearing during
which he considered Ms. Johnson's motion to modify sentence, he re-
vealed his reasoning, noting:
It is in the defendant's best interest and certainly in any uncon-
ceived child's interest that she not have anymore children until she
is mentally and emotionally prepared to do so. The birth of addi-
tional children until after she has successfully completed the court-
ordered mental health counselling and parenting classes dooms
both her and any subsequent children to repeat this vicious cy-
cle .... The stress and trauma of a sixth child on a person who is a
convicted child abuser with her record cannot but help delay or
prevent her ultimate rehabilitation. 47
Despite Judge Broadman's own opinion that the birth of additional
children would retard Ms. Johnson's rehabilitation, the state presented
no evidence suggesting that this opinion was well-founded. In reviewing
the constitutionality of unusual probationary conditions, courts require
more than a mere speculative link between a condition and the goals of
probation. Indeed, the Supreme Court of California has held that while
"the severity of the sentence and the placing of the defendant on proba-
144. Id. at 565-66.
145. People v. Beach, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 622.
146. In re Mannino, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880, 882 (1971) (citations omitted). See also People v.
Richards, 552 P.2d 97, 100 (Cal. 1976); In re Martinez, 150 Cal. Rptr. 366, 369 (1978).
147. Respondent's Supplemental Brief, supra note 97, at 8-9 (citing RT from Motion to
Reconsider at 19-21).
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tion rest in the sound discretion of the trial court... [t]he term [judicial
discretion] implies the absence of arbitrary determination, capricious dis-
position or whimsical thinking. It imports the exercise of discriminating
judgment within the bounds of reason."' 48 Courts have used this stan-
dard to strike conditions which, although not wholly unrelated to a de-
fendant's rehabilitation, are simply too tangential to justify.
In People v. Beach, 4 9 for example, a California appellate court re-
jected as too speculative a condition requiring that an elderly woman
convicted of violently assaulting a neighbor move out of her home.
Although the court acknowledged that the continuing deterioration of
her neighborhood had contributed to the woman's action and therefore
her continued presence in the neighborhood could lead to future assaults,
it concluded that "[k]eeping appellant out of her home and neighborhood
would not necessarily prevent future criminal conduct of a similar nature
except perhaps in her own particular neighborhood."15
In a similar vein, Ms. Johnson's attorneys argued that "the nexus
between fertility and Johnson's episode of abusive discipline [was] too
attenuated to justify stripping Johnson of her procreative choice."''
They stressed that nothing in the record established that family size or
pregnancy contributed to Johnson's abusive behavior. 5 2 At the same
time, the state maintained on appeal that "because the defendant [will
have] fewer parental responsibilities and, so [consequently], more time
and energy to devote to improving her life skills and parenting skills, she
may well have a greater opportunity for rehabilitation."'5 3 The state's
position might have been bolstered by studies that suggest that the birth
of additional children contributes to the stress that prompts violent epi-
sodes in abusive parents, but these were not introduced.
One study, which examined various causes of family violence, re-
vealed that one of the factors that "influenced substantially" severe
mother-to-child abuse was family size.' 54 In a sample involving nearly
1500 Utah families, the study found that "[t]he rate of severe physical
148. In re Cortez, 490 P.2d 819, 823 (Cal. 1971).
149. 195 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1983).
150. Id. at 386. See also Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 96, at 47-49.
151. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 96, at 48.
152. Id. Johnson's counsel did not themselves offer any proof that these were not factors
leading to Johnson's abusive episode, rather they simply argued that the state had not shown
that they were contributive. In addition, Ms. Johnson's attorneys argued that rather than
promoting her rehabilitation, the Norplant condition might actually hinder it. They con-
tended that "stripping Johnson of her fundamental right to make decisions about her own
body ... is at least as likely to undermine as to foster her rehabilitation .... The government is
likely to undermine her feelings of self-esteem and her ability to view herself as a responsible
adult who can guide the welfare of her children." Id. at 49-50.
153. Respondent's Supplemental Brief, supra note 97, at 7.
154. Boyd C. Rollins and Yaw Ohenebe-Sakyi, Physical Violence in Utah Households, 5 J.
OF FAM. VIOLENCE 301, 308 (1990).
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violence toward children was about twice as high.., when four or more
children were in the home."' 55 Acknowledging that stress is one of the
key contributing causes of child abuse, the authors concluded that be-
cause "[m]others with large families... would seem to be prime candi-
dates for a high level of frustration or stress . . . such mothers were
substantially more likely to resort to severe physical violence toward
their children than were other mothers." '156
Studies such as these could have helped the state establish that post-
poning the birth of additional children would have enhanced Ms. John-
son's chances for rehabilitation by reducing the stress that causes child
abuse. If the state had been able to substantiate a link between family
size and the likelihood of child abuse, it could have argued that the Nor-
plant condition futhered the goals of probation by promoting Ms. John-
son's rehabilitation and protecting her children from future abuse. Thus,
the state might have been able to satisfy part one of the compelling inter-
est test.'5
7
2. Part Two: Does the Value to Society in Imposing the Norplant
Condition Manifestly Outweigh the Impairment of Ms.
Johnson's Right to Privacy?
The second part of the compelling interest test requires that the
value of the probationary condition to the public manifestly outweighs
the impairment of the probationer's constitutional rights. In the Johnson
case, the state would have had to establish on appeal that the value to the
public in the possibility that Ms. Johnson and her children might benefit
from the temporary postponement of additional children manifestly out-
weighed her total loss of reproductive autonomy.
The United States Supreme Court has identified the safeguarding of
children as unique and worthy of unfailing protection.' 8 The California
Supreme Court also has recognized that the protection of children consti-
tutes an interest of "unparalleled significance."' 59 A recent California
Supreme Court case demonstrates the length to which that court will go
to defend the protection of children as an important state interest. In
Walker v. Superior Court, the state was required to balance the defend-
ant's constitutional right to freedom of religion against the state's interest
155. Id. at 308.
156. Id.
157. The state argued precisely this on appeal. Respondent's Supplemental Brief, supra
note 97, at 11 ("[A] probation condition prohibiting a woman convicted of child abuse from
becoming pregnant for a period of time may decrease the possibility that she will abuse her
children in the future .... [Thus] the goals of probation will be effectuated: the defendant's
rehabilitation will be fostered, and society will be protected.").
158. See, e.g., Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
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in protecting children. In allowing the manslaughter prosecution of a
Christian Scientist who had relied on prayer rather than medicine to
treat his ill child, the Court noted that "[r]egardless of the severity of the
religious imposition, the governmental interest is plainly adequate to jus-
tify its restrictive effect."' "' Thus, in certain circumstances, society's in-
terest in protecting children will outweigh the impairment of an
individual's constitutional rights.
The circumstances of child abuse often require prompt state inter-
vention to ensure the protection of children. The incidence of abuse and
neglect of children, as reflected in reports of abuse to child welfare agen-
cies, increased 66% between 1980 and 1986.161 The National Center for
the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect estimates that nationwide
one million children are abused each year and 2,000 to 4,000 children die
annually as a result of maltreatment.1 62 Some commentators fear that
child abuse "is assuming epidemic proportions and is becoming more en-
trenched in the population. ' 163 These figures present a very compelling
justification for state intervention to protect children despite the resulting
impairment of individual privacy.
It is well-established law, however, that the state may not infringe
upon a woman's right to privacy to protect her pre-viable fetus. In Roe v.
Wade, 164 the Court held that during the first two trimesters of preg-
nancy, the state may not regulate to protect the fetus because prior to
viability, the state's interest in protecting the fetus is not of an adequately
compelling character.1 61 In addition, California courts have explicitly
held that the state's child-abuse statutes are not intended to protect the
unborn. 166 If the state may not impair the right to privacy to protect a
pre-viable fetus, it is likely that a court would also prohibit a state from
interfering with the right to privacy to protect future, yet-to-be-conceived
children. Thus, the only way the Norplant condition could satisfy the
second part of the compelling interest analysis is through proof that it
would protect Ms. Johnson's existing children.
As noted briefly above,1 67 some child-abuse studies indicate that
family size negatively influences violent tendencies in abusive parents.
One study revealed that "[tihe proportion of families with four or more
children was nearly twice as high among the families of the reported
160. 763 P.2d at 820. See RSB, supra note 96, at 12.
161. See Enalee Gottbrath Flaherty, M.D. & Howard Weiss, M.D., Medical Evaluation of
Abused and Neglected Children, 144 AM. J. DISEASES OF CHILDREN 330, 330 (1990).
162. Harold I. Kaplan, M.D. and Benjamin J. Sadock, M.D., CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 485
(1988).
163. Id.
164. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
165. Id. at 164-65.
166. See Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912, 913 (1977).
167. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
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abuse children [in the study's sample] than among all families with chil-
dren under [eighteen] in the U.S. population."16 One explanation for
the disproportionate presence of large families in reported child-abuse
cases is the established role that stress plays in triggering child abuse. 169
Child-abuse experts have emphasized that such stress factors as "the so-
cioeconomic position of parents, marital stresses, excess children, unem-
ployment, social isolation . . . [and] unwanted or 'problem' children"
precipitate abuse in parents.
170
These studies may support the state's contention that the temporary
postponement of additional children would have protected Ms. Johnson's
existing children because they indicate that increased family size contrib-
utes to the stress that causes child abuse. It is debatable, however,
whether a reviewing court would have found the nexus between family
size and occurrence of child abuse to be sufficiently compelling to justify
such a substantial impairment of Ms. Johnson's constitutional rights.
More specifically, it is unclear whether these studies, which indicate only
that family size is one of many factors contributing to the "multi-causal
nature of child abuse,"' 17 would satisfy the Cortez standard requiring
that judicial discretion in meting out probation conditions must be
"within the bounds of reason" and not the result of "arbitrary determina-
tions, capricious dispositions, or whimsical thinking."'172 Ms. Johnson's
attorneys were not convinced; rather they contended that "the gain [in
protecting Ms. Johnson's existing children] promised by mandatory con-
traception is illusory."'
173
Even assuming that the state could have conclusively established on
the basis of these studies that the Norplant condition both furthered the
goals of probation and manifestly outweighed the interference with Ms.
Johnson's right to privacy, it would have still needed to satisfy the final
part of the compelling interest test.
168. David G. Gil, Violence against Children, 33 J. MARRIAGE AND FAM. 637, 640 (1971).
See also Jonathan B. Kotch and L. Parke Thomas, Family and Social Factors Associated with
Substantiation of Child Abuse and Neglect Reports, 1 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 167, 173 (1986)
("Families with two or more children were nearly twice as likely to be substantiated as families
with only one child.").
169. David G. Gil, Unraveling Child Abuse, in CHILD ABUSE AND VIOLENCE 12 (David S.
Gil ed., 1979) ("[A]busive attacks tend to be triggered by stress and frustration which may
cause reduction or loss of self control.").
170. Blair Justice & David F. Duncan, Life Crisis as a Precursor to Child Abuse, PUB.
HEALTH REP., Mar. - Apr. 1976, at 110, 110 (emphasis added) (quoting R.J. Gelles, Child
Abuse as Psychopathology, 45 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 611 (1973)).
171. Justice & Duncan, supra note 170, at 112.
172. In re Cortez, 490 P.2d 819, 823 (Cal. 1971).
173. Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 79, at 11.
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3. Part Three: Does the Norplant Condition Represent the Least
Restrictive Means Available of Protecting Ms. Johnson's
Children?
The final prong of the compelling interest test requires that "the
state utilize the 'least intrusive' means to satisfy its interest. Mere con-
venience of means or cost will not satisfy [this part of the] test for that
would make expediency and not the compelling interest the overriding
value." '174 Ms. Johnson's attorneys argued that there were other means
available to protect Ms. Johnson's children that would have been less
restrictive of her constitutional rights. In particular they proposed that
counseling, parenting classes, assistance with day care, and limitations on
and monitoring of the family relationship would have been more reason-
able and constitutionally sound alternatives.175 In addition, they argue
that as a last resort, the state should temporarily remove children from
an abusive parent's custody rather than infringe upon a probationer's
constitutional freedoms. 176 This viewpoint is supported by case law.
In People v. Pointer, for example, a California Court of Appeal con-
cluded that the sanction of forced contraception was too severe a proba-
tion condition for the crime of child abuse given the availability of other,
less severe measures. 177 The court noted that "the salutary purpose [of
preventing future child abuse] can adequately be served by alternative
restrictions less subversive of appellant's fundamental right to procre-
ate."' 178 In the court's opinion, these alternatives included pregnancy
testing, prenatal and neonatal care, and the ultimate measure of remov-
ing the appellant's children born during probation from her custody. 179
Several cases from other states concur in this conclusion.
1 80
174. Wood v. Superior Court, 212 Cal. Rptr. 811, 820 (1985).
175. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 96, at 56-58.
176. Id. at 56.
177. 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 (1984). It is interesting to note, however, that although the
court ultimately concluded that the birth control condition was unconstitutional, earlier in its
opinion it held that the condition was reasonably related to future criminality and therefore
met the statutory requirements of probation. Id. at 364. For a further discussion of the analy-
sis which courts use to determine statutory validity of probation conditions, see supra note 136.
178. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
179. Id. While pregnancy testing and mandatory prenatal and neonatal care would be less
subversive of a defendant's right to procreate, they would certainly still interfere with her
fundamental right to refuse medical treatment.
180. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that
although constitutional protections are reduced by probationary status, a condition prohibiting
a convicted child abuser from becoming pregnant was not reasonably related to future crimi-
nality when the defendant also was prohibited from having custody of any minor children
during the probationary period); Howland v. State, 420 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(because defendant was already denied custody of any child during probation, condition re-
quiring that he not father any children served no additional purpose); State v. Mosburg, 768
P.2d 313 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (probation condition requiring convicted child abuser to refrain
from becoming pregnant was unconstitutional); State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio
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Many of the above outlined alternatives would have been less re-
strictive of Ms. Johnson's right to privacy than the Norplant condition.
For example, unlike the Norplant condition, a rehabilitation plan that
coupled parenting classes and counseling with child care assistance and
home monitoring would not intrude at all with two of the three aspects
of privacy discussed above: the right to choose to reproduce and the
right to refuse medical treatment. Although this alternative plan would
still interfere with Ms. Johnson's right to parent, it would arguably do so
in a manner less burdensome on that right than a condition that prohib-
ited the parenting of future children for a period of years. Thus, even if
the Norplant condition were to have satisfied the first two parts of the
compelling interest test, it would likely have been unable to meet the
demands of the third because alternatives less restrictive of the right to
privacy were available. In the case of a first-time offender such as Ms.
Johnson, therefore, the Norplant condition is unconstitutional.
A repeat offender who has previously received some of the less in-
trusive methods of treatment discussed above might present an exception
to this conclusion. Given statistics which indicate that reported rates of
reabuse are exceedingly high,'81 this possible exception is worthy of con-
sideration. In the case of the repeat offender whom a court feels is suita-
ble for continued probation rather than incarceration, the less restrictive
alternatives outlined above-such as parenting classes, counseling and
assistance with child care-may already have been imposed during a
prior probation and failed. In such a scenario, the sentencing court
would be faced with several options: (1) reimpose the same probationary
conditions in the hope that they ultimately prove efficacious; (2) reim-
pose similar rehabilitative conditions while simulataneously ordering
Norplant use in an attempt to reduce the stress which precipitates child
abuse; or (3) remove the abuser's children from her custody to guarantee
their protection while further treatment is pursued.
Critics of the Norplant decisions have argued that even in the case
of a repeat offender, removal of the abuser's children from her custody is
preferable to ordering Norplant use.' 2 Such a measure was also en-
dorsed by the court in Pointer, which argued that, rather than violating
the defendant's right to privacy, it was better to remove all of her chil-
dren including ones born during her probation if doing so was necessary
Ct. App. 1976) (condition requiring probationer not to have a child for five years was arbi-
trary, remote, and violated her constitutional right to privacy).
181. Naomi Ferleger et al., Identifying Correlates in Reabuse of Maltreating Parents, 12
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 41 (1988). Ms. Ferleger notes that "studies examining abusers...
in treatment have reported reabuse rates ranging from 16% to 66.8%. The discrepancy often
found between official and unofficial rates of reported reabuse suggests that the true incidence
of reabuse is seriously underreported in official tallies." Id.
182. Lev, supra note 52, at A17; Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 96, at 56.
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to protect them from future abuse. 183 Yet, assuming that adequate safe-
guards such as home monitoring could be put into place to ensure the
continued safety of the children, it is not clear that the removal of chil-
dren from the home of a repeat offender would be less restrictive of her
constitutional right to privacy than the Norplant condition.
Although the Norplant condition subverts the reproductive auton-
omy aspect of the right to privacy, removal of children from a parent's
custody impairs another recognized aspect of that same right to privacy:
the right to raise one's children free from state interference.184 Indeed, a
decision to temporarily remove a probationer's children from her cus-
tody denies her any control over their care. Advocates of removal over
Norplant use place a premium on the right to reproduce that some wo-
men may be unwilling to bear. Some offenders may prefer to use Nor-
plant during probation rather than suffer the temporary loss of custody
of their children. At least one commentator has argued that "if we con-
demn court-ordered birth control because it diminishes a woman's dig-
nity and violates [her] privacy, it is incumbent upon us to ask whether
stripping her of custody the moment she gives birth is truly a more re-
spectful alternative." 
1 85
An argument can be made, however, that the nexus between requir-
ing a forfeiture of an individual's right to parent and child abuse is more
logical and compelling than the nexus between requiring a forfeiture of
an individual's right to reproduce and child abuse. In addition, the fiscal
crisis currently facing most states may preclude the type of intensive
monitoring necessary to assure that, if children remain in the home while
the abuser's rehabilitation is pursued, they do not continue to suffer
abuse at her hands. Nevertheless, the case of the repeat offender, in
which there is tension between two aspects of the right to privacy-the
right to reproduce and the right to parent-may present a court with a
more difficult constitutional choice than the case of the first-time of-
fender. In situations involving recurrent abusers, a court may not find
itself compelled to conclude that the removal of children from the home
is less burdensome on the repeat offender's constitutional right to privacy
than the Norplant condition. This is particularly likely if it has evidence
that the Norplant condition will help reduce the likelihood of renewed
abuse against existing children.
183. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
184. See supra notes 114-17 and 126-28 and accompanying text.
185. Stacey L. Arthur, The Norplant Prescription: Birth Control, Woman Control or Crime
Control?, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 73 (1992). The author suggests that "[t]here is a strange irony in
the argument that because coerced contraception violates a woman's autonomy, an alternative
should be imposed that will relegate her to the role of gestational vessel" by allowing her to
continue to bear children, but denying her custody of them while she is on probation. Id. at
81.
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A determination that the Norplant condition violates the right to
privacy of first-time offenders, and may violate the privacy rights of re-
peat offenders, under the three-part test used in California to determine
the constitutionality of probation conditions does not dictate the results
that may be reached in other states. As mentioned previously,1 86 Texas
and Nebraska-the two other states in which the Norplant condition has
been imposed-use a less rigorous, although slightly modified, "reason-
able relation" standard to test the constitutionality of probation condi-
tions that restrict constitutional rights. 18 7 This less rigorous standard
may permit greater impairment of a probationer's privacy rights and en-
able the Norplant condition to withstand a constitutional challenge.
III. Other Constitutional Issues 8'
A. Eighth Amendment-Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution provides in part that
the federal government shall not inflict cruel and unusual punish-
ments.189 The Amendment is applicable to the states by virtue of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 90
The constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punish-
ment undisputedly prohibits punishments that were considered cruel at
the time of its ratification, such as burning at the stake and drawing and
quartering. The scope of the Amendment, however, is not limited to ex-
cessive physical punishment, but rather "draw[s] its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
186. See supra note 136.
187. Id. Both the Texas and Nebraska standards might be termed "reasonable relation
with teeth." The Texas standard requires that a probation condition which infringes the con-
stitutional rights of the probationer must be "reasonably calculated to contribute significantly"
to the rehabilitation of the defendant. Simpson v. State, 772 S.W.2d 276, 281 (Tex. 1989)
(emphasis added). Nebraska requires that in addition to the condition being reasonably re-
lated to the offense committed, a condition which restricts constitutional rights "should be
sparingly imposed." State v. Morgan, 295 N.W.2d 285, 288 (Neb. 1980) (emphasis added).
One commentator has suggested that even in those courts that normally employ a reasonable
relation standard to review the constitutionality of probation conditions, "[ilt is difficult to
imagine... that an appellate court ... would dare approve a condition as controversial as
mandatory contraception without first determining that there are no other reasonable means
by which future child abuse can be averted." Arthur, supra note 185, at 67.
188. This section examines whether the Norplant probation order constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment or violates equal protection. There remain, however, several other
constitutional issues that are beyond the scope of this Note, such as freedom of religion and
concerns about procedural due process. For a discussion of the due process ramifications of
the Norplant cases see Arthur, supra note 185, at 67.
189. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
190. See Robinson v. Cal., 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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ety."' 9' Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that punishment which "of-
fends fundamental notions of human dignity"'192 or "seek[s] to cast out a
defendant from society" 193 is cruel and unusual even though its only ef-
fect is psychological. In addition, courts also consider whether a crimi-
nal sentence is so disproportionate to the crime for which the defendant
was convicted as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.1
94
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on the specific issue of
whether involuntary sterilization constitutes cruel and unusual punish-
ment, many commentators believe that this would be its likely ruling
given the Court's "recent emphasis on the Eighth Amendment as pro-
tecting the 'dignity of man.' "195 Skinner v. Oklahoma196 presented the
Court with the opportunity to determine whether forced sterilization as a
penal sanction constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The court de-
clined, however, to consider the petitioner's Eighth Amendment chal-
lenge. It instead applied strict scrutiny and determined that an
Oklahoma statute which required the sterilization of certain classes of
felons, but not others, violated the Equal Protection Clause.197 Despite
its failure to address the Eighth Amendment issue directly, the Skinner
opinion demonstrates, the seriousness with which the Court views invol-
untary sterilization. Underscoring the danger inherent in such a statute,
it noted: "The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reach-
ing and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or
types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disap-
pear.... [T]he individual whom the law touches.., is forever deprived
of a basic liberty." 198
The lower courts that have addressed this issue have reached diver-
gent conclusions. In the earliest case to consider whether government-
imposed sterilization constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, the
Supreme Court of Washington concluded that it did not.' 99 The appel-
lant, Peter Feilen, was convicted of the rape of a child under the age of
ten and ordered to undergo a vasectomy, a statutorily authorized
191. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). See also Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W.
Scott, Jr., CRIMINAL LAW § 2.14(0, at 177 (2d ed. 1986).
192. Furman v. Ga., 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972), reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972).
193. Id. at 273 (Brennan, J., concurring).
194. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284, 290 (1983).
195. LaFave & Scott, supra note 191, at 177.
196. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (statute required the sterilization of "habitual criminals" which it
defined as persons convicted two or more times for crimes of "moral turpitude").
197. Id. at 541-42. In an earlier case, Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), the court upheld a
statute authorizing the sterilization of "mental incompetents" housed in state institutions.
Here again, the court declined to determine whether sterilization constituted cruel and unusual
punishment although the respondent had argued before the court that it did not. Id.
198. Id. at 541.
199. State v. Feilen, 126 P. 75 (Wash. 1912).
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sanction. 2°°
In rejecting Feilen's Eighth Amendment challenge, the court
stressed that there was no evidence that the procedure would subject
Feilen to any significant pain.2"1 In addition, the court deferred to the
legislative determination that permanent sterilization was an appropriate
and proportionate punishment for the crime of statutory rape.20 2 Fi-
nally, the prevailing public support for eugenic theory2 "3 clearly influ-
enced the court's decision, which noted that "[t]here appears to be a
wonderful unanimity of favoring opinion as to the advisability of the ster-
ilization of criminals and the prevention of their further propagation.""
The court appeared willing to limit its categorization of cruel and unu-
sual punishments only to those "of a barbarous character and unknown
to the common law." 20 5
Two other cases from the same period reached contrary results. In
Davis v. Berry, a federal district court in Iowa invalidated on Eighth
Amendment grounds a statute requiring the sterilization by castration of
twice-convicted felons.20 6 Although the court recognized that the physi-
cal suffering incident to castration was greater than a vasectomy, this
finding was not dispositive. Rather, the court emphasized the psycholog-
ical trauma consequent to the procedure, noting "[physical suffering] is
not the only test of cruel punishment; the humiliation, the degradation,
200. Id. at 76.
201. Id. at 77 (noting that a vasectomy is "an office operation, painlessly performed in a
few minutes" under local anesthetic).
202, Id. It is difficult to see what additional societal protection was accomplished by steril-
izing Mr. Feilen given his sentence of life imprisonment. Id. at 76.
203. The eugenics movement was founded by Francis Galton and enjoyed significant sup-
port in this country at the turn of the century. It has since been discredited. Adherents to the
movement believed that it was in society's best interest to control and limit the reproduction of
mental and criminal "undesirables" whose traits were thought to be caused by defective genes.
See Philip Reilly, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION, at 1-4 (1991).
204. Feilen, 126 P. at 77.
205. Id. at 78 (citation omitted). The Washington statute was repealed in 1913 and re-
placed by a sterilization law that did not apply to convicted felons. Reilly, supra note 203, at
51.
206. Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413, 417 (S.D. Iowal914), rev'don other grounds, 242 U.S. 468
(1917). Because the statute mandated the sterilization of all twice-convicted felons, it avoided
the equal protection considerations implicated in the statute in Skinner, discussed supra notes
196-98 and accompanying text. See also State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410, 412 (S.C. 1985)
(ruling that castration constitutes cruel and unusual punishment). Castration renders more
profound effects than vasectomy including physical disfigurement, removal of the testes, and
certain, permanent sterilization. Despite these rulings characterizing castration as cruel and
unusual punishment, a court in Harris County, Texas, approved the recent request by a de-
fendant to be surgically castrated rather than go to prison for the rape of a thirteen-year-old
girl. The defendant made the request after reading that the judge presiding over his case sup-
ported the castration of some sex offenders. Judge OKs Molester's Plea to be Castrated, S.F.
EXAMINER, Mar. 7, 1992, at A9. The defendant later reconsidered his decision and elected to
;tand trial. Richard Lacayo, Sentences Inscribed on Flesh, TIME, Mar. 23, 1992, at 54.
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and the mental suffering [associated with involuntary sterilization] are
always present and known by all the public, and will follow him whereso-
ever he may go. This belongs in the Dark Ages."2 7 The court specifi-
cally rejected the use of eugenic theory as a justification for the
punishment.0 8
Likewise, in Mickle v. Henrichs, a federal district court in Nevada
enjoined the performance of a vasectomy on a defendant convicted of
statutory rape after concluding that the statute authorizing the sanction
constituted cruel and unusual punishment.209 Once again, the court em-
phasized the psychological impact of the procedure on the defendant.
The court argued that the punishment ran contrary to the goals of pun-
ishment, noting that "degrading and humiliating punishment is not con-
ducive to the resumption of upright and self-respecting life. When the
penalty is paid, [and the offender is freed], he... will carry to his grave, a
mutilation which, as punishment, is a brand of infamy." 210
It is difficult to predict how these considerations would influence an
Eighth Amendment challenge to the Norplant cases. The major justifica-
tion relied upon in Feilen-eugenics-has now been discredited and
could no longer be used to defend the imposition of the Norplant condi-
tion. Indeed, opponents of the Johnson decision frequently cite the po-
tential for impermissible social engineering as one of the gravest dangers
of court-ordered Norplant use.21 In addition, unlike the court in Feilen
which focused strictly on the physical pain of sterilization, the courts in
Davis and Mickle stressed the psychologically far-reaching impact which
sterilization would have on the defendants. The influence which the per-
manence of the procedures had on the courts' decisions is unclear. Both
opinions, however, emphasized the injustice in requiring defendants, who
had paid their debts to society by completing imposed prison sentences,
to carry a "brand of infamy to the grave."
The Norplant condition, however, is temporary and coincides with
the probationary period. Once the defendant has completed probation,
the device can be removed and fertility will return quickly.2 12 It is un-
clear whether the temporary nature of this "brand of infamy" would re-
move the cruelty from the sentence by reducing the duration of the
207. Davis, 216 F. at 416.
208. Id. at 416-17 (The court asked, "Must the marriage relation be based and enforced by
statute according to the teachings of the farmer in selecting his male animals to be mated with
certain female animals only?").
209. 262 F. 687 (D. Nev. 1918).
210. Id. at 691. Similarly, the ACLU argued that rather than promote her rehabilitation,
the Norplant condition would impede the development of Ms. Johnson's sense of responsibility
and judgment. See Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 96, at 49-50.
211. See, e.g., Helen R. Neuborne, In the Norplant Case, Good Intentions Make Bad Law,
L. A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1991, at M1; Lewin, supra note 12, at Al.
212. Flattum-Riemers, supra note 15, at 103-05.
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psychological trauma which concerned the courts in Davis and Mickle.
At least one commentator has suggested that "[b]ecause the procedure is
painless, inconspicuous, and reversible, claims of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment [based on psychological trauma] are not persuasive in the age of
Norplant. '2 13 This conclusion, however, too readily dismisses the dis-
tinction between voluntary Norplant use and court-ordered implantation
of the device. Use of the contraceptive under the direction of a court
entails greater potential for feelings of humiliation and social ostracism
on the part of the defendant, particularly given the nationwide attention
the Norplant cases have received.
In addition, the physical discomfort associated with Norplant use
distinguishes it from sterilization accomplished through vasectomy or
tubal ligation. While the Norplant implantation procedure is compara-
bly painless, unpleasant and often painful side effects persist during Nor-
plant use. Some studies indicate that 95% of women using the device
experience adverse side effects.214 The influence that the existence of this
type of continuing discomfort would have on a reviewing court is un-
clear. A strong argument could be made, however, that given the large
number of women who willingly use Norplant despite its side effects, an
Eighth Amendment challenge grounded solely on the discomfort they
cause would be insufficient.
Another consideration is the absence of legislative sanction for the
imposition of Norplant as a condition of probation. In the three early
twentieth century cases discussed above, the sterilization condition was
statutorily authorized.215 The absence of legislative authorization in the
Norplant cases increases the likelihood that a reviewing court would
question a judge's discretion to impose such an unusual condition at the
sentencing stage. Lack of legislative approval also raises concerns about
whether the severity of the sanction in relation to the offense has been
fully considered and whether it comports with society's "evolving stan-
dards of decency." In a recent decision, the Supreme Court stated that a
determination of whether a punishment comports with society's "evolv-
ing standards of decency" consists primarily of an examination of "stat-
utes passed by society's elected representatives. ' 21 6 Given that probation
codes routinely give judges broad discretion in crafting conditions of pro-
bation, it is unclear how this analysis could be conducted in relation to
the Norplant condition. In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor
argued that an analysis of whether a punishment comports with society's
"evolving standards of decency" must include a proportionality analysis
which considers whether the punishment is excessive in relation to the
213. Flannery, supra note 41, at 218.
214. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
215. See Feilen, 126 P. 75, 76 (Wash. 1912); Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413, 414 (S.D. Iowa
1914); Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687, 687 (D. Nev. 1918).
216. Stanford v. Ky., 492 U.S. 361, 369-70 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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offense committed. 217 Traditionally, the proportionality analysis exam-
ines: "(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii)
the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and
(iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions. 21 8 Again, given that the Norplant condition is the prod-
uct of the exercise of a judge's discretion authorized by the probation
code, the traditional factors considered in a proportionality analysis are
not readily applicable to the Norplant cases.219
It is possible that the Norplant condition might escape Eighth
Amendment challenge entirely because it is offered as a means of rehabil-
itating the defendant and not as a form of punishment. In Feilen, Davis,
and Mickle, the courts imposed sterilization as a statutorily authorized
punitive sanction. A court may well view a probation condition that is
part of a rehabilitative plan as immune to an Eighth Amendment chal-
lenge. This possibility is less likely, however, when the condition is of-
fered as an alternative to incarceration and thereby takes on more of a
punitive character.
B. Fourteenth Amendment-Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment man-
dates that the government treat individuals who are similarly situated
similarly.2 ' Classifications based on race, national origin, and alienage
are subject to strict judicial scrutiny which requires that the government
must have a compelling interest, and use the least restrictive means of
achieving it, to justify the use of discriminatory classifications.22'
The Supreme Court has adopted a lesser level of scrutiny for gender-
based classifications. This "intermediate" level of scrutiny requires that
gender-based classifications "must serve important governmental objec-
tives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objec-
tives. '22 2 The Court has shown a willingness to carefully scrutinize the
stated objectives and application of gender-based classifications to ensure
that they are not the product of "the mechanical application of tradi-
tional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and
217. Id. at 381.
218. LaFave & Scott, supra note 191, at 181 (citations omitted).
219. An argument can be made, however, that the novelty and gravity of the Norplant
condition is an indication that it is disproportionate to the offense committed.
220. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
221. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
222. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1976); see also
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (party alleging gender-based classi-
fication is valid has the "burden of showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the
classification").
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women." 223
Within the category of gender discrimination, the Court has yet to
conclude that pregnancy-based classifications by themselves constitute
per se unconstitutional gender discrimination, despite the fact that only
women become pregnant.224  Rather, the Court carefully has distin-
guished between pregnancy discrimination that does not render any iden-
tifiable benefit to men and pregnancy discrimination which "impose[s] on
women a substantial burden that men need not suffer" and found that
only the latter category violates equal protection.225
The Norplant cases raise two main equal protection concerns. First,
court ordered Norplant use imposes on female child abusers a particu-
larly intrusive probationary condition that their male counterparts are
not required to withstand. Second, because all four of the "Norplant
defendants" are welfare recipients and three of the four are minorities,226
serious questions regarding the possible discriminatory application of the
Norplant condition have been raised. 227 Each of these concerns will be
addressed in turn.
First, a probation condition that requires only female child abusers
to use birth control is susceptible to an equal protection challenge be-
cause men also abuse their children. Such unequal treatment by the gov-
ernment of similarly situated men and women constitutes a prima facie
case of gender-based discrimination. A reviewing court would be unable
to skirt an equal protection challenge by characterizing the Norplant
condition as a pregnancy-based classification; the defendants in the Nor-
plant cases were ordered to use the device not because they had the po-
tential of becoming pregnant, but because they had the potential of
becoming parents. Male child abusers share this same potential.
Judge Broadman and others have justified the Norplant condition
by arguing that it will help rehabilitate the child abuser by temporarily
223. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 726. Although equal protection challenges most frequently in-
volve state statutes and ordinances, courts have held that state court trial orders must also
satisfy the mandates of the Equal Protection Clause. See, eg., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S.
429 (1984) (upholding judgment of a state court divesting mother of the custody of her child
because of the mother's remarriage to a man of a different race violated equal protection).
224. See Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-29 (2d ed. 1988).
225. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1977) (emphasis added). In addi-
tion, cases involving pregnancy discrimination are limited to the employment context and gain
support from both the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and Title VII; it is unclear whether the
Court would apply this same analysis to pregnancy discrimination occurring in non-employ-
ment contexts.
226. Ms. Johnson and Ms. Knighten are African-American; Ms. Tovar is Hispanic. All
three and Ms. Carlton were welfare recipients at the time the Norplant condition was imposed.
Kathy Holub, When Worlds Collide, THE WEST, July 7, 1991, at 11; interviews with Donna
Goode, Harris County Prosecutor (Knighten), Mark Ellis, Harris County Prosecutor (Tovar)
and Kent Turnbull, Lincoln County Attorney (Carlton).
227. See, eg., Stephanie Denmark, Forcing Norplant on Poor is Ploy to Control Women's
Bodies, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 5, 1991, at 6; Goodman, supra note 1, at 79.
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preventing the stress that accompanies the birth of a child.228 This ra-
tionale applies with equal force to male child abusers. Although the
stress of pregnancy, childbirth, and the first few months of child care fall
more heavily on the mother, the demands of an infant undoubtedly affect
the father as well. Studies indicating that the birth of additional children
may exacerbate violent tendencies in abusive parents have not differenti-
ated between male and female child abusers. 229 Therefore, a pattern
mandating that only female child abusers use birth control while on pro-
bation may violate the Equal Protection Clause because it would discrim-
inate against women solely on the basis of their gender, though members
of either sex can be abusive parents.
Although courts could also impose birth control conditions on male
child abusers, it is unclear whether this alone would be sufficient to shel-
ter the Norplant condition from an equal protection challenge. No form
of male contraception compares to Norplant. At least two commenta-
tors have argued that the imposition of birth control upon both men and
women as a probationary condition still would violate equal protection
because the "only readily available birth control device for men is a con-
dom, which does not involve significant bodily intrusion .... If a male
defendant were convicted of child abuse and were ordered to use birth
control ... as a condition of probation, the invasion on his privacy would
not be as great, the health dangers associated with birth control use
would not be as severe, and the punishment would not be so cruel."' 23
In addition, the only other widely used form of male birth control, the
vasectomy, is not readily reversible." 1 The permanence of the procedure
distinguishes it from Norplant and also makes it highly unlikely that a
court could impose such a condition given the general recognition of per-
manent sterilization as a cruel and unusual punishment.232
A second equal protection concern raised by the Norplant cases is
that, at least in the first four cases, courts have imposed the condition
exclusively on lower income and minority women.233 Many commenta-
tors have cautioned that underlying biases could result in the discrimina-
tory imposition of the condition.234 Bolstering these concerns are studies
which indicate that members of minority groups and lower income indi-
viduals "have been disproportionately subject to reporting and prosecu-
228. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 154-56 and 168-70 and accompanying text.
230. Jack P. Lipton and Colin F. Cambell, The Constitutionality of Court-Imposed Birth
Control as a Condition of Probation, 6 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 271, 288 (1989).
231. One study indicates that using modem microsurgical techniques, vasectomy reversal
rates are about 50%. E. Scott Yarbro & Stuart S. Howards, Vasovastomy, 14 UROLOGIC
CLINICS N. AM. 523 (1987).
232. See supra notes 206-10 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 226.
234. Denmark, supra note 227, at 6; Goodman, supra note 1, at 79.
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tion of child abuse. ' 235  Despite these justified concerns, an equal
protection challenge alleging that court ordered Norplant use discrimi-
nates against lower income women is unlikely to succeed because the
Court has refused to apply any form of heightened scrutiny to wealth-
based classifications.236 The Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny to
classifications based on race.2 37 The Court, however, has required that
an intent to discriminate be demonstrated before an equal protection ra-
cial discrimination claim will be upheld.238 A mere showing of a dispa-
rate impact upon members of a minority group is insufficient. 239 As
such, a race-based equal protection challenge is also unlikely to succeed.
Despite the obstacles hindering a race-based challenge to the Nor-
plant condition, an equal protection challenge requiring a court to apply
strict scrutiny may still be possible. In Skinner v. Oklahoma,24" the
Court invalidated an Oklahoma statute that required some classes of
twice-convicted felons, but not others, to be permanently sterilized.241
Although the Court recognized that legislative decisions are normally
entitled to great judicial deference, it strictly scrutinized the statute and
concluded that it "ran afoul" of equal protection. The Court defended
its use of the strict scrutiny standard noting that because the legislation
"involves one of the basic civil rights of man[,] ... strict scrutiny of the
classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential, lest
unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious discriminations are made against
groups or types of individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty
of just and equal laws."242 Thus, opponents the Norplant decisions may
be able to rely on Skinner to force a reviewing court to strictly scrutinize
the constitutionality of court-ordered Norplant use. As a result, oppo-
nents may be able to raise many of the same arguments used in a right to
privacy challenge regarding the availability of less intrusive alternatives
to establish that court ordered Norplant use for female child abusers vio-
lates equal protection.
235. Board of Trustees Report, supra note 38, at 1820 (quoting Richard O'Toole et al.,
Theories, Professional Knowledge, and Diagnosis of Child Abuse, THE DARK SIDE OF FAMI-
LIES: CURRENT FAMILY VIOLENCE RESEARCH, 349, 359 (David Finkelhor et al. eds., 1983)).
236. See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-29, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973).
237. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
238. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-44 (1976).
239. Id.
240. 316 U.S. 535 (1941).
241. The statute mandated sterilization for only those felons who were twice convicted of
crimes of "moral turpitude", but did not apply to "white collar" crimes such as embezzlement
even though the two crimes were "intrinsically the same." Id. at 538-39.
242. Id. at 541.
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IV. Proposed Alternatives
The imposition of the Norplant condition on a first-time child-abuse
offender is unconstitutional. The use of Norplant as a condition of pro-
bation in the Darlene Johnson case was inappropriate and an unconstitu-
tional violation of her right to privacy given the availability of less
restrictive rehabilitative conditions. Although Ms. Johnson had com-
piled a record of convictions involving theft and fraud, this was her first
child-abuse conviction. The imposition of such an intrusive condition as
temporary sterilization was disproportionate to her offense which could
ultimately prove to be an isolated incident.
Court-ordered Norplant use for women who repeatedly are con-
victed of child abuse presents a more difficult question. Many would
argue that in the case of the recurrent abuser, the state should remove
children from the home, rather than violate an abuser's fundamental
right to reproduce. By endorsing such a measure, however, critics ap-
pear willing to barter the forfeiture of one aspect of the right to privacy-
the right to parent-for the protection of another, the right to reproduce.
In addition, recent studies reveal that foster care systems frequently do
not provide the safe havens children deserve.243 So that, in addition to
impairing the abuser's right to parent, a decision to protect her right to
reproduce by placing her children in foster care may also result in mov-
ing children from one dangerous environment to another. The recurrent
child abuser, therefore, presents a difficult constitutional and ethical
question given the burden on at least one aspect of the abuser's right to
privacy and the potential danger to her children under either scenario.
At the same time, proponents of court-ordered Norplant use have
seemingly failed to address the full ramifications of state-coerced, tempo-
rary sterilization. The Supreme Court has described the right to
reproduce as "one of the basic civil rights of man.., fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the race."2" The speed with which certain
segments of the criminal justice system have endorsed the temporary for-
feiture of this right by first-time child abusers is alarming. Judge
Broadman has argued that the Norplant condition is defensible because
"[he] take[s] away people's rights all the time .... that's what judges
do."'245 This argument fails to address the fact that while the impairment
243. Ann Bancroft, Foster Care Criticized By Little Hoover Panel, S.F. CHRONICLE, Apr.
10, 1992, at A21 (noting that "children removed from troubled families are often damaged by
the very system designed to protect them").
244. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
245. Ainsworth, supra note 78, at 10. It is interesting to note that Judge Broadman himself
has undergone a change of heart. In announcing the revocation of Ms. Johnson's probation
after she twice tested positive for cocaine use, he stated that the Tulare County Court now
"recognizes that the coercive use of Norplant fails to serve the rehabilitative goals of Califor-
nia's probation statute." California: Mandated Norplant Now Irrelevant, ABORTION REP.,
Apr. 15, 1992.
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of a probationer's First 2 4 6 and Fourth24 7 Amendment rights, for exam-
ple, is a serious matter, state-coerced relinquishment of the right to pro-
create is rife with a host of ethical issues that simply are not present when
other constitutional rights are infringed by a probationary condition.
Concerns about the exceptional dangers of a probation condition
that denies an individual the right to reproduce are bolstered by studies
which indicate that socio-economic status and race often determine
whether health care workers, who are under an obligation to do so, actu-
ally report individuals they suspect of child abuse to child protective
services.248 If health care workers are influenced by underlying biases in
deciding whom to report, it is not unrealistic to predict that judges will
be susceptible to these same improper influences in deciding which pro-
bationers are appropriate candidates for Norplant use.
As a result of these concerns, court-mandated Norplant use cannot
be countenanced even for repeat offenders. The risks are simply too
great, despite the fact that in the case of a recurrent abuser Norplant use
as a condition of probation might withstand constitutional attack because
of the exhaustion of less restrictive probationary alternatives. Because
Norplant could play an affirmative role in rehabilitating a child abuser,
however, its use should not be entirely precluded. Rather, courts faced
with a repeat offender should encourage, but not order, her to use Nor-
plant while rehabilitation is pursued. For those women who agree to use
the device, it should be provided without cost along with free medical
follow-up.
Conclusion
"Child abuse is an area of concern that one has great difficulty ap-
proaching objectively and analytically. It is a phenomenon that arouses
moral outrage and other intense emotions. '2 49 The use of Norplant as a
condition of probation reflects the extreme frustration experienced by
judges and prosecutors as they search for a solution to the escalating
problem of child abuse. The Norplant cases present an unparalleled con-
stitutional and ethical dilemma because they pit the most "basic of civil
rights," the right to reproduce, against one of the cruellest crimes society
246. See, e.g., People v. Osslo, 323 P.2d 397, 412-13 (Cal. 1958) (probationer convicted of
crime related to his union activities, restricted from participating in them during probation).
247. See, eg., People v. Wardlow, 278 Cal. Rptr. 1. 2-3 (1991) (probationer required to
submit to announced, warrantless searches by law enforcement agents).
248. Race and Status May Determine ifAbuse is Reported, UPI, Oct. 31, 1981 (Regional
News Section) (citing Ohio State University study). See also Irene Sege, Agony of Child Abuse
Cuts Across Class Lines, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 27, 1989, at 1 (Metro/Region Section); Gail
Zellman, The Impact of Case Characteristics on Child Abuse Reporting Decisions, 16 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 57, 67 (1992).
249. David S. Gil, Unraveling Child Abuse, CHILD ABUSE AND VIOLENCE, 37 (David S.
Gil ed., 1979).
Fall 19921
246 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 20:207
endures, the mistreatment of children. Limiting Norplant's role as a re-
habilitative measure to only those defendants who volunteer to use it will
no doubt hamper its impact as a creative and potentially beneficial rem-
edy for child abuse. But the alternative is to allow courts to "play God"
by selecting who will and who will not be allowed to reproduce.
